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Abstract— The concept of “indirect control” has become a 
relevant discussion term in relation to activation distributed and 
small-scale demand and generation units to provide resources for 
power system balancing. The term and its association with price 
signals has, however caused some confusion as to its correct 
definition, either as a control or a market concept. This paper 
aims to provide a conceptual introduction to "indirect control" 
for management of small and distributed demand side resources. 
A review of control concepts and an analysis of "indirectness" 
features are provided to create a framework for systematic 
classification of indirect control strategies. The concepts 
developed then enable a discussion of control performance and 
valuation of direct- and indirect control strategies.  
 
Index Terms—Demand side management, Demand side 
resources, Control, Indirect control  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
EMAND side resource (DSR) refers to the 
geographically distributed modular power generation, 
consumption and energy storage systems which are located on 
the demand side and have the capability of altering their 
consumption pattern. As a whole, DSR exhibits a significant 
potential to improve the economics of electricity by 
facilitating energy management, providing emergency 
response and ancillary services [1]-[2]. Conventional demand 
response (DR) programs organized by utilities can be split in 
two categories. The first group requires a fast and reliable 
response from DR programs, so that the DSRs are remotely 
controlled by the utilities in a master-slave manner under 
bilateral agreements. These programs primarily target medium 
to large size commercial and industrial DSRs and they are 
typically limited to interruptability services. A second group 
of DR programs is aimed at modifying the consumption of a 
large number of small-scale DSRs by means of economic 
incentives. These so called dynamic tariff programs include 
e.g. hourly real time pricing (RTP) and time-of-use tariffs 
(TOU) but also capacity pricing are used to shift consumption 
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patterns and achieve better system economics [3], with 
‘dynamics’ in the scale of hours to years.  
 Along with the anticipated increase in penetration of DSR 
in the distribution systems, both the utilities and the emerging 
non-utility entities intent on exploiting the added value of 
coordinating a fast response from these low cost small-scale 
DSR by means of coordinated control strategies. By providing 
fast and reliable grid-supporting services such as power 
balancing, congestion management or voltage regulation, a 
win-win situation for various stakeholders could be created. 
These approaches entail the introduction of new control 
structures to power system operation, often referred to as 
Virtual Power Plants (VPP) or active demand side 
management systems (DSM), which could be realized by a 
number of different control strategies. Using Denmark as a 
testfield, several ongoing projects e.g. iPower1, Flexpower2 
and EcogridEU 3  are developing control solutions for DSR 
management for emerging DSR technologies such as electric 
vehicles (EVs) or heat pumps.  In these projects, DSM 
solutions are investigated from technical, economic and social 
perspectives, where the interests of different parties i.e. 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Distribution System 
Operators (DSOs), Balance Responsibles (BRs, here to be 
considered mostly equivalent to ‘aggregators’) and DSR 
owners are balanced in the context of a deregulated power 
market.  
This paper distinguishes between two control paradigms, 
namely “direct control” and “indirect control”. The former 
alludes to a conventional control approach which requires 
DSR state information to compute reference trajectories for 
the DSR consumption to follow. The latter approach is often 
associated with broadcasting of incentive signals (prices) with 
an update frequency of e.g. 5 minutes to the DSRs. Compared 
to the hourly dynamic tariffs, this update frequency is fast, and 
falls into the time range of generator ramps, for example. A 
commonality of these control approaches is the concept of 
‘aggregation’: a larger number of functionally similar units are 
combined via a control structure to be represented and to 
behave ‘as one’ in the energy market or in the supply of 
ancillary services. However, it is understood that the term 
‘indirect control’ is too generic and DSM examples exist that 
do not employ uni-directional price signals but do share some 
‘indirectness’ properties.  
                                                          
1 http://www.ipower-net.dk/ 
2 FlexPower homepage hosted by Ea Energianalyse 
3 http://www.eu-ecogrid.net/ 
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A. Indirect control for DSM 
Classification beyond this particular example of 5-min-
price signals is not straightforward. In particular, the 
combination of control- and market-oriented concepts makes 
indirect control a difficult concept to frame.  
Two central characteristics of ‘indirectness’ are to be 
analyzed for conceptual clarification: 
(α) The relationship between control objective and 
observables is indirect and may be characterized by 
random unobservable behavior and sometimes large 
time delays. 
(β)  The control structure is not purely hierarchical: i.e. 
independent (economic) decision making at a local 
level is part of the control strategy, which influences 
the system response such that a deterministic 
containment cannot be guaranteed. 
Thus, a common characteristic of indirect control concepts 
is that a conventionally direct relationship between control 
objective and observable information and between command 
and response is broken and replaced by an indirect 
relationship. There are therefore two different types of 
indirectness: for (α) the actual response to the signal is not 
observed and for (β), the signal is not a command, but only an 
incentive. In other words, in case of direct control the power is 
observed and controlled via power reference commands. In 
the other extreme case of indirect control by prices, (α) the 
response is not directly observed, and only (β) an incentitive 
signal is used, influencing consumption in a desired direction.  
B. Value Drivers for Indirect control 
Some main drivers for the development of indirect control 
strategies for DSR management include: 
• The independence of local decision-making is an 
appealing concept in a multi-stakeholder setting; 
• Avoiding the need to collect detailed local state 
information about consumers is favourable to privacy 
concerns and reduces communication requirements; 
• Statistical smoothing enables a significant response of 
an aggregate, whereas the response in individual 
contributions would seem very small and unreliable. 
On the contrary, for direct control, the effort involved in 
state-measurement and fine grained, bi-directional communi-
cation for large numbers of small units may outweigh the 
benefits of increased controllability. Note that also for indirect 
control by prices, power consumption data has to be collected 
on a corresponding time resolution (e.g. 5min), but it does not 
require the real-time feedback. The trade-off between direct 
and indirect control approaches would be balanced differently 
for different control needs and different capabilities both on 
the side of the aggregator and on the side of the consumer.  
 
The objective of this paper is to present a conceptual basis 
for classification and analysis of indirect control strategies. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, a brief summary of 
relevant control concepts is provided in Section II. In Section 
III, some definitions for the aggregated control of DSR are 
introduced and Section IV  presents the classification of 
indirect control. Section V discusses the valuation of indirect 
control as control strategy in context of direct control 
concepts. Section VI concludes.  
II.  BASIC CONCEPTS AND NOTATION 
To prepare for the encoding employed for the classification 
at hand, some basic relevant control concepts as well as the 
notation shall be clarified.  
A. Notation 
S Objective as well as further information required 
for a meaningful value judgement 
r Control reference (command) 
yp, yfcn System output and feedback:  
p … power;  
fcn … functional variable (e.g. room 
temperature) 
e  Control error 
d disturbance 
(.)* Forecasted variable 
[i], 
[1..i..N] 
Single vs. multiple signals (correspondingly: thin 
arrow: single signal, thick arrow: signal bundle) 
DM Decision maker – a computational entity capable 
of (formalized) value judgement. 
B. Local Control Patterns 
Open-loop control and closed-loop control or feedback 
control are two basic control principles. Both aim at effecting 
a desired response (control objective) in one end of the 
system, targeting a controlled variable (e.g. a voltage level), 
by means of adjusting another manipulated variable, utilizing 
the interactions within the system (e.g. excitation voltage). For 
closed loop control the controlled variable has to be 
observable by means of direct measurement or model-based 
inference (observer). The system behavior is then incorporated 
directly into the generation of a control action by means of a 
control law (also: controller). In open loop control, only an 
understanding (model) of the system enables the computation 
of a control action.  
Fig. 1.  Cascade pattern of open-loop decision making and closed-loop 
reference tracking.  
Because open-loop control does not require an immediate 
mapping of observations to decisions, it typically allows the 
consideration of more contextual information. Here the term 
Decision Maker (DM) is employed, to refer to an entity that 
considers trade-offs with respect to a more complex external 
environmnent and is capable of taking independent-value-
oriented decisions. However, an open-loop configuration 
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cannot provide the stabilizing and disturbance rejecting 
properties of closed-loop control. A common pattern, 
combining both properties, is therefore the cascade of “open-
loop” decision making with a closed-loop disturbance 
rejecting and reference tracking control, as depicted in Fig. 1.  
 
C. Plant Model 
Open-loop and model-based control functions require a 
representation of the controlled system (plant model) to 
compute control actions. Typically these models are 
formulated as differential- or difference- equations, derived 
either by analytical or automated learning methods. 
Uncertainties associated with the plant dynamics or projected 
disturbances can also be considered explicitly for robustness 
or risk hedging purposes. The structure of uncertainty can be 
captured e.g. by uncertainty sets associated with model 
parameters or explicitly by probabilistic models. 
D. Control Structure & Coordination Patterns 
Control structure captures how control is organized with 
respect to control objectives, observables, actuation and 
decision making, and the controlled process.  
In real systems, there is commonly a set of independent 
control objectives, for example safety objectives or local 
process requirements, which would not be organized under the 
same control hierarchy. Objectives of a realistic system are 
therefore organized in a heterarchical structure due to over-
lapping scopes of control [4]. In this case, the system’s 
degrees of freedom need to be organized in a design phase to 
allow for non-conflicting operation (decentralized control, 
coordination-by-design).  
If also the decision-making aspect would be decentralized, 
a coordination strategy has to be devised that guarantees the 
reflection of mutual interests (e.g. by employing a mutual 
value exchange) in the decision-making problems. Such a 
coordination strategy can be market-based or follow other 
organizational strategies. An example for a market based 
strategy has been presented in [5].  
E. Conventional Indirect Control 
The control literature defines indirect control as a control 
strategy in which the control variable is only indirectly 
associated with the actual control objective. The relationship 
between actual controlled variable and objective is modeled, 
e.g. via a inverse model or look-up table [6]. Using this 
understanding of indirect control, here indirect control is 
defined as follows: 
Definition: An indirect control structure is a control 
structure in which the control objective does not coincide with 
observables, and the relationship between observables and 
objective is established by means of a model.  
Using the inverse model as the open-loop part, also indirect 
control can be illustrated by the basic pattern presented above 
(Fig. 2). Note that according to the above definition, there is 
no decision making involved in this pattern. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Conventional indirect control pattern as described in [6]. 
III.  INDIRECT CONTROL OF DSR: DEFINITIONS 
The term “indirect control” has been coined to emphasize a 
contrast to “direct control” in context of DSR management 
(DSM). The general setup for DSM consists of a central 
‘aggregator’ controller (typically representing a balancing 
responsible party or an associated service provider) managing 
a large portfolio of small DSR units which are also controlled 
locally. In any case, DSM consists therefore of a bi-level 
setup, where available flexibility at a local control level is 
employed to satisfy further control objectives at a central 
level. In order to define the meaning of ‘indirect’ in a control 
setup in opposition to direct control, first the aggregator-based 
direct control concept is introduced. Then definitions for the 
classification of indirect control are developed.  
A. DSR Management via Direct Control Aggregators 
In general, direct control refers to a setup where an 
agreement/contract exists between aggregator and a number of 
DSRs allowing the aggregator to directly control the DSRs 
within the framework of the contracts. In this setup, a 
synchronized two-way communication exists between 
aggregator and DSRs: the DSRs controllers reports local 
information to the aggregator and the aggregator sends control 
commands based on this information, as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
  
Fig. 3.  Schematic of ‘direct control’ with aggregator controller and local 
controller.   
 
A set of N DSRs are under the jurisdiction of an aggregator 
controller. Each DSR is controlled by a local controller via 
control signal ݑ௙௖௡  and subject to local disturbances ݀ . The 
local controller is configured by a Decision Maker, which here 
represents the user interface or intelligence in reflecting user 
requirements to the control constraints, setting the local 
objectives ୪ܵ୭ୡୟ୪ , such as a desired household temperature 
range; the local controller also receives control commands ݎ௣ 
from the aggregator which the DSR will seek to track, 
monitoring local power consumption ݕ௣  and the local 
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functional state variable ݕ௙௖௡ (e.g. the current temperature). In 
addition to receiving control signals from the aggregator, the 
DSRs report local power consumption ݕ௣  and the local 
functional state variable ݕ௙௖௡to the aggregator – this completes 
the direct control two-way communication structure. Finally, 
the DSRs may be able to provide predictions of future power 
consumption and constraints ݕ௣∗, ݕ௙௖௡∗ , to the aggregator, 
which may be considered a ‘flexibility forecast’, in case of 
varying requirements.  
B.  Definition of “Indirectness” Criteria 
As discussed in Section I.A, two key criteria enable the 
classification of indirect control strategies: 
(α)  “breaking of the control loop”  
(β)  “independence of local controller” 
Both of these criteria have been employed independently in 
the literature to motivate the term ‘indirect control’. The first 
is motivated purely from a conventional control perspective 
whereas the latter criterion requires the integration of a value-
oriented (economic) decision-perspective.  
    1)  Loop-breaking: Aggregation-based indirect control 
The loop-breaking (α) in DSR management is enabled by 
an aggregation of similar units, for which a combination of 
strongly correlated behaviours overlaid with uncorrelated 
random processes enable a statistical smoothing effect with a 
controllable mean. The larger part of indirect control concepts 
for DSR employ this aggregation effect. The control strategy 
exploits the aggregation effect reducing the need for dedicated 
bi-directional communication and detailed local state 
information. This key aspect can be defined as: 
Definition: The aggregation effect is a smoothing by 
summation of diversity (due to uncorrelated random 
processes) in combination with a strongly correlated 
(coherent, modelizable) response to observable exogenous 
variables or control signals which can be captured in an 
aggregated model.  
The aggregation effect is thus fundamentally associated 
with the law of independent random processes (cancelling 
mutual fluctuations) on the one hand. On the other hand and it 
requires the existence of a behavioural commonality of 
elements in the controlled system.  
The nature of the uncorrelated processes varies for 
different indirect control approaches. It includes for example: 
unsychronized processes, forecast uncertainties, independent 
decision-making, etc. Also the commonality aspect varies: e.g. 
common thermal properties of a collection of households, or a 
predictable economic response to an economic incentive.  
    2)  Independent local control 
The independency of local control is achieved by 
employing a value-oriented decision maker (DM) at the DSR 
plant ‘in-the-loop’. In contrast, for a non-independent local 
control structure, the control reference is a command defining 
an objective for the local controller to pursue and achieve, 
thus binding the respective degrees of freedom of the DSR 
plant. In such a control strategy a local decision maker would 
be contractually bound to stay ‘outside the loop’, free only to 
influence remaining degrees of freedom – and of course with 
the choice of opting in or out of the respective contracts.  
The DM ‘in-the-loop’ will trade off benefits and costs of 
electricity consumption at every instant. Which means that 
information exchanged with the respective aggregator  does 
not have the character of command, but rather of coordination. 
Coordination between higher-level control objectives and 
local control objectives is established on the basis of a 
coordination scheme ensured e.g. by a market. It appears that 
two definitions are required: 
Definition: A DSR with decision-maker is independent, if 
its intentional behaviour only results from a local judgement 
of preferences, based on locally decidable trade-offs based on 
available value-related information.  
Definition: An aggregator control structure with 
independent local control utilizes value-oriented information 
exchange, but no commands, to coordinate the response of 
independent DSR plants. 
It is open, whether these independent local decision makers 
should be considered “controlled” in the classic sense. The 
term “coordination” appears more appropriate here.  
IV.  INDIRECT CONTROL CLASSIFICATION 
Using this classification approach, three conceptually 
different indirect control strategies have been identified:  
A. Only (α): Pure aggregation based indirect control; 
B. Only (β): Independent local control; 
C. (α)&(β): Price signal based indirect control.  
Note that aggregation concepts that purely apply 
commercial aggregation with no control structure at the 
aggregator level, such as conventional consumption 
responsible parties, have been excluded. 
A. DSR Control With Indirect Functional Variables 
One case of indirect control which applies the principle (α) 
is presented in [7]: a control loop aggregating thermostatically 
controlled loads, as illustrated in Fig. 4, when the local 
functional variable yfcn[i] is a local temperature. A locally 
associated control objective is a desired temperature (range), 
which is specified by a local decision maker (likely manually 
in this case). Neither local temperature reference rfcn[i] nor 
local state are measured or known by the aggregator 
controller. A “secondary”, not locally measured variable is the 
power consumption yp[i], which also has no associated local 
control objective. In this example, the aggregated local feeder 
power yp,sys was measured as input to the controller. The 
momentary power consumption is indirectly controlled by 
adjustment of a functional constraint as a common global 
reference Δrfcn,constraints, e.g. the thermostate limits, which 
constrains the local controller’s switching behavior. In this 
approach, a statistical model is employed by the aggregator to 
characterize the relationship between the 
measurable/estimated aggregated feedback yp,sys and the global 
control reference Δrfcn,constraints and to generate the reference 
setpoints. 
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Fig. 4.  DSR control with indirect functional variables. 
 
No local data was collected and yet the local feeder power 
flow could be manipulated within specifiable performance 
bounds sufficient to supply secondary regulation. The control 
scheme is indirect in the control sense that there is only a 
statistical relation between controlled and manipulated 
variables and no local state information is shared with the 
aggregator. The concept is sometimes presented as innovative 
direct control scheme, since the performance of the controlled 
system corresponds to the performance of directly controlled 
systems.   
B. DSR Control with Internal Market Platform  
With market based control schemes, as in Fig. 5, the 
aggregator creates an exchange market for the DSRs to trade 
products, e.g. power, energy and flexibility. An aggregator has 
to translate his technical/commercial needs into market 
bids/offers and use the marketplace to retrieve the desired 
response from the DSRs.  
 
Fig. 5. Market based indirect control. 
 
In a double-sided auction bids and offers are submitted by 
all parties, and the market prices are derived by means of 
market clearing mechanisms. The resulting control reference 
for the DSRs is then the power it previously bid at the clearing 
price [8],[9]. Due to the choice of a market with double-sided 
bidding (e.g. bids: [price q,power p], or more complex bids) 
as coordination instrument, there is an automatic 
independence of a local decision maker in the sense of 
indirectness type (β). 
Event though the local DM is independent in bid-selection, 
therefore, the response after market clearing is deterministic. 
The communication effort for this type of control is relatively 
high, but no local, unit-specific information has to be 
communicated.  
C. Indirect Control via Price Signals 
In a single sided auction uni-directional price signals are 
distributed by the aggregator and market clearing is performed 
by the voluntary reponse of the DSRs [10],[11]. In case that 
the aggregator has information about the operational status of 
a electrical network, a control loop with optimal pricing can in 
principle be formulated to address grid issues such as real-
time power balancing and network congestion [12]-[14]. The 
use case considered here is the purpose of reducing the 
portfolio imbalance of a balance responsible party. The basic 
control structure is outlined in Fig. 6.  
 
Fig. 6. Price signal based indirect control. 
 
Although the prices theoretically can be updated on the 
scale of seconds, in practice they are generally updated on the 
time scale of 5-60 minutes in order to reduce the transaction 
cost and the volume of information flow.  
The locally metered response would be based on smart 
meter data. It can be collected by the aggregator with a certain 
time delay and is also made available to the local decision 
maker, as indicated by the dotted line in Fig. 5. The prices are 
meant to adequately reflect the needs of the aggregator. A 
control strategy for the aggregator would create price signals 
based of its power needs (e.g. current imbalance) and the 
expected price-responsiveness of the DSR plants, but would 
not exceed the imbalance cost incurred if the demand side 
response is insufficient.  
This final category of indirect control combines aggregation 
based indirect control (α) with the independence of the 
decision maker (β).  
V.  VALUATION OF INDIRECT CONTROL 
Indirect control that integrates independent (economic) 
decision making in a control structure marks a qualitatively 
different paradigm of control. To understand the benefits of an 
indirect control design requires a clarification of the relevant 
trade-offs, which will be discussed in this section. 
A. Perfomance as a Control Structure 
The performance of a controller is typically measured in 
terms of its ability to minimize the mismatch between control 
objective and actual process response, as illustrated in Fig. 6 
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(sometimes also the control effort).  
In power systems, the performance requirements for 
example for the delivery of a power balancing ancillary 
service (e.g. secondary control) are composed of firm dynamic 
response and reliability requirements. Failure to follow a 
control command (the control objective) in such a framework 
is a failure to meet a contractual agreement. The delivery of 
ancillary services thus requires the ability to support the 
system at a contractually specified level of dynamic 
performance and reliability (purely technical requirements).  
 
Fig. 6. Control performance based on mismatch and control effort. 
 
 In principle, a performance measure for aggregation-based 
indirect control designs can be established straightforward by 
establishing the difference to a direct control equivalent loop. 
For the case of indirect control with functional variables, it 
has been shown that a specifiable performance level can be 
achieved [7]. In cases where this performance basis for 
comparison can be established in a meaningful way, direct and 
indirect control could be compared on the basis of 
implementation requirements etc.  
In particular price-signal based indirect control cannot be 
expected to deliver such performance: as the DSRs’ response 
to the price signals is dependent on the end users’ time 
varying preferences i.e. availability and willingness to respond 
to economic incentives, this control approach may not be able 
to achieve a consistent responsive control – and also highly 
volatile price signals could result, potentially exceeding the 
value of the desired response. To achieve a fully reliable 
balancing control, a price signal based control would have to 
be combined with other control structures in a portfolio.  
B. Assigning Value to Indirect Control 
The exact tracking of a power reference is not necessarily a 
meaningful requirement for control structures based on 
independent decision-makers. In a framework of economic 
decision-making for profit, as is the case for a Balance 
Responsible Party (see Fig. 6), the full value of a control 
contribution is reflected on the balance sheet: The trade-off 
for an ancillary service is in the value of the compensation 
minus the cost of delivering the required control performance 
minus the penalties incurred for failure to deliver the required 
control performance. Due to steep penalty cost, it is then 
acceptable to focus on strict control performance requirements 
in such cases. However, for example in the use case of 
reducing the portfolio imbalance for balancing responsible 
(BRs), the commercial value of flexible demand is not driven 
by the controllability according to firm reliability 
requirements but by the potential of directly matching of 
regulation cost with imbalance cost. A reduction of portfolio-
internal balancing requirements at a consistently cost lower 
than the imbalance cost carries value for a BR. 
The real benefit of β-type DSR aggregators is thus that 
they are operated directly on a value based trade-off between 
cost and utility. This value-oriented controllability provided 
by  is meaningful if smooth economic objectives are tied to 
the control response, as is the case for BRP imbalances.  
Fig. 6. Value Generation: Value based trade-offs vs. control services4. 
 
Apart from improving techniques such as modeling and 
forecasting fundamental to the indirect control design both on 
the aggregator and the local control side, a BR or aggregator 
therefore also needs to consider a risk hedging strategy that 
combines the benefits directly and indirectly controlled DSRs 
in their balancing power portfolio. 
In a broader perspective, controllability of DSR has to be 
valuable for society as a whole, and therefore it is also 
relevant to consider the benefits for all involved actors. 
Consider the primary value trade-offs for System Operators 
(SO), Balancing Responsibles and DSR owners as suggested 
in Fig. 6. Chief concern for system operators is the reliability 
of the power system and cost improvements are only 
considered meaningful if overall reliability is not at stake – by 
specifying service requirements, ‘reliability contributions’ can 
be outsourced to commercial entities (the BRs), seeking to 
compete for cost-efficient service delivery at a profit. For a 
DSR owner, the conventional service value from a DSR is the 
energy service, comparable to that of a non-controllable unit. 
In addition to (reliable) cost reductions that do not put the 
service level at stake (the focus of direct control), indirect 
control might offer an opportunity to the DSR owner to 
directly choose the trade-off between cost and comfort, 
dependent on the users current situation (given that this 
concern is of importance to the user). The development of 
appropriate contracts as well as user interfaces with DSR 
owners that realize the mutual benefits for both DSR owners 
and the aggregator are a key concern for all DSM 
technologies.  
C. Technical Challenges 
Beyond the challenges of conceptually understanding indirect 
control, there are a number of technical challenges and 
                                                          
4 The primary value driver for these respective entities depends on their 
mutual role in relation to the infrastructure [4]. The reduction of DSR owners 
values to a simple consumerist ‘comfort vs. cost’ trade-off is only for the 
current argument’s sake. Other trade-offs could be relevant for e.g. 
commercial or particularly environmentally minded consumers.  
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uncertainties that will influence the deployment on indirect 
control for DSM. 
    1)  Modeling and predicting the aggregated DSR response 
For the single sided aution indirect control setup, to 
generate a precise control signal that results in the expected 
response from the aggregated DSRs requires advanced 
modeling techniques that can chacterize the relationship 
between price signal power response to support the decision 
making of an aggregator. Although the aggregation effect 
supports smoothing of the response, human local decision 
making can be difficult to model and predict when the 
populaton in an aggregated system is small.  
    2)  Measuring the aggrated DSR response 
The complexity of modeling and predicting the aggregated 
DSRs’ response is simplified when some online local or 
aggregate measurements are fed back to the aggregator, as in 
the case discussed in Section IV-A, where the aggregated 
power output is measured at substatition or feeder level. 
Under present competitive retail market in most of Europe, a 
commercial entity such as a BR will not have access to such 
grid-related measurements, which renders the respective 
control example currently infeasible in Europe.  
    3)  Stability of indirect control  
For power systems with real-time markets the market 
stability can be coupled with the controlled system stability 
[15]. Also oscillations of the aggregated plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles (PHEV) in response to price signals and 
delayed reponse from the aggregated DSRs have been 
observed in [15]. Price oscillation (volatility) in itself can also 
be a stability concern – representing a potential market failure 
[17]. In mitigating such failure of the ecomic coordination 
functions, a control-oriented thinking about price-signals 
could help defining appropriate pricing mechanisms [18]. 
    4)  Coordination and interoperability of control solutions 
From the perspective of power system operation, an 
integrated control system is requested to maintain the 
reliability and the security of a power system. The emergence 
of indirect control requires system operators to carefully 
examine the interoperability between various direct and 
indirect control solutions for different regulating purposes. 
For instance in a distribution grid with a high penetration of 
electric vehicles, several aggregators would offer independent 
economically driven charging. Then the distribution system 
operator DSO may consider the possibility of coordinating 
potential congestion issues. In this case it is important to 
develop and understanding of the interoperability of control 
solutions in order to coordinate system requirements with 
competitive interests of aggregators [19]. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
This paper presented a conceptual understanding and  
classification of indirect control strategies. Existing and 
proposed solutions have been reviewed and classified into the 
presented conceptual framework. An elaboration on the 
valuation and technical challenges of indirect control provide 
a reference for further investigations.. 
In particular the identification two categories indirectness, 
one remaining within the control engineering domain, and one 
that integrates economic decision-making (or more generally: 
value-oriented deliberation) will support the further discourse 
on active demand side management.  
Further work will address the integration and valuation of 
mixed portfolios of direct and indirect control as well as the 
further analysis of co-existence of such control-solutions with 
respect to overall control architecture of the power system. 
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